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Henry Buller“ONE SLASH OF LIGHT,
THEN GONE”
ANIMALS AS MOVEMENT
T HE TITLE FOR THIS PAPER comes froma poem by Ruth Padel [2004] called“Tiger Drinking at Forest Pool”. In it
Ruth Padel speaks of the animal as “flirting
between the worlds of lost and found”. The
animal lies “just beyond” any purely scientific
or phenomenological understanding, any hard
and fast “object” or “subject”, that “between”
opens the door to imagination, to otherness,
to myth and a multitude of different ways of
knowing. It is reminiscent of Michel Serres’
“bruit de fond” [1982] and Heidegger’s
“Zwischen” [1989]. More importantly, it
reveals the animal as embodying movement,
of moving away as well as towards (“flirt-
ing”) or going somewhere else, beyond our
framing into some physical but perhaps also
meta-physical “other” place. But “flirting”
also suggests something teasing and some-
thing playful in that movement, something
that both enchants and provokes an emotional
response. Flirting is, after all, for attracting
interest and this, above all, is what animals
do. As Lévi-Strauss once famously remarked,
they are “good to think with”. Animals move
in and out of the (human) frame. They both
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define it and exceed it. One is reminded here
also of John Berger’s famous essay in which
he writes:
Animals came from over the horizon,
they belonged there and here [1980: 4].
Moving and being are one. As Georges
Perec wrote:
To live is to pass from one space to
another [1974: 6].
In a recent video clip, taken at the Kruger
National Park in South Africa and posted on
the internet, a crocodile emerges from a lily-
covered pool to seize a young elephant by the
trunk. The elephant struggles to prevent itself
being dragged into the water by pushing its
legs out before it, shifting its centre of gravity
and arching its back. A second video clip,
also posted on the internet, shows a gorilla
running on its hind legs in the rain. As he
runs, he lifts his hands over his head to pro-
tect himself from the falling raindrops. Both
of these gestures are, in many ways, highly
familiar to many human beings too. In these
embodied responses and in these shared
movements, there is the potential for commu-
nication and understanding that arguably
crosses and hence challenges more founda-
tional barriers of difference and denomina-
tion. As humans, we might not share verbal
language with non human animals but through
our bodies and the movement of our bodies,
we do partage, as Darwin pointed out many
years ago [1899], worldly forms of expres-
sion, emotion, response and, thereby recogni-
tion that can both facilitate cross-species
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for a different ethical engagement born of a
shared corporeal and fleshy communality.
Philosophical engagement with the non-
human has been predominantly autobiographical,
the animal acting as foil to human exception-
alism and witness to our ontological distinc-
tiveness. Recent years have seen a “post-
human” embrace of the non-human; not as a
rejection of the human but rather as part of
what has been a continual act of de-centring.
Drawing largely upon the twin theoretical her-
itages of, on the one hand, “the metaphysics
of subjectivity” (from Heidegger to Deleuze
and beyond) and, on the other, “the nature-
culture hybridity” of science studies (from
Bruno Latour and beyond), this has both
considerably raised the profile and legitimacy
of non-human accountings and encouraged us
to find ways to, in Giorgio Agamben’s words
“smash the anthropological machine” [2004].
Nevertheless, a good deal of this post-human,
or more-than-human, endeavour retains its
conceptual and theoretical attachment to what
is essentially philosophical and conceptual
positioning in which the animal remains only
“good to think with”. Even Derrida, whose
work underscores so much of contemporary
human-animal studies, was not curious enough
for Donna Haraway:
Why did Derrida not ask, even in prin-
ciple, if a Gregory Bateson or Jane
Goodall or Mark Bekoff or Barbara
Smuts or many others have met the gaze
of living, diverse animals and in response
undone and redone themselves and their
sciences? [2008: 21]
Arguably, what is needed are new, or dif-
ferent, ways of knowing; “positive knowl-
edge” as Donna Haraway calls it [2008]. Cary
Wolfe in his argument for a refocusing of the
post-humanist agenda argues that the princi-
pal challenge is one of epistemology:
[It] forces us to rethink our taken-for-
granted modes of human experience,
including the normal perceptual models
and affective states of Homo sapiens
itself, by recontextualising them in terms
of the entire sensorium of other living
beings and their own autopoietic ways
of “bringing forth a world” ways that
are, since we ourselves are human ani-
mals, part of the evolutionary history
and behavioural and psychological reper-
toire of the human itself [2010: xxv].
Wolfe’s call for a broader sensorium of
affective engagement with the non-human
animal articulates well with current social sci-
ence interest in moving beyond the primacy
of (uniquely human) language, words and
representations as the sole vectors of commu-
nication, understanding and knowing [ibid.].
At a wider scale, the shift to a more-than-
human(ism) accompanies an associated shift
from “meaning” to “affect” and from “dis-
course” to “practice” [Whatmore 2006: 603-
604]. In this “counter-linguistic turn” [Weil
2006], other forms of subjectivity are poten-
tially revealed not through rational thought
but through corporeal, haptic and sensory per-
formance. In her perceptive paper, Simone
Weil draws in both the autobiographical
writings of the veterinarian Temple Grandin,
whose autism has given her a unique insights
into farm animal behaviour, and the poetry of
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141Rilke to claim that, in our approach to under-
standing animals, humans are:
[...] disadvantaged by their consciousness
and unable to perceive “the open” that
is available to animal eyes [2006: 88].
Jakob von Uexküll used the term “Merk-
mal” or “perception mark” [O’Neil 2010] to
denote those features of the world the per-
ception of which constitutes an animal’s
subjective world (Umwelt). Might our own
“perception marks” of these non-human sub-
jectivities be arguably too constrained, and
limited, not just by our linguistic orderings
and scientific methods but also by our guilty
conscience. Donna Haraway again:
What if work and play, and not just pity,
open up when the possibility of mutual
response, without names, is taken seri-
ously as an everyday practice available
to philosophy and to science? [2008: 22]
In this paper, I want to explore the idea of
studying, observing, practicing and sharing
embodied movement as a means to experi-
ment with a new mode of connectivity and
“being” with non-human animals:
[For movement] provides a physical
mechanism to bridge the theoretical gap
that separates human from non-human
[Lulka 2004: 439].
The article works towards a more prag-
matic “epistemology of movement”. In the
first section, I review the way in which ani-
mal movement, the potential of movement,
motility and the resultant agency has provided
a focus for both philosophical and represen-
tational accounts of the non-human animal.
In the section that follows, I consider the use
of movement as a mechanism (to borrow
Lulka’s phrase) for developing a more gener-
ous and inclusive notion of animality; one
that opens the potential for a common lexicon
of human and non-human understanding, a
way of seeing and articulating with the animal
world in a more ethical and less hierarchical,
more vital, affective and relational sense. As
Tim Ingold writes:
Wherever there is life, there is move-
ment [2011: 72].
Animals as Movement
Animals have always been known through
movement. Animals are movement. Aristotle
wrote around 350 BC:
Some animals fly, some swim, some
walk, others move in various other
ways.
“Most animals are motile” which means
the power to make themselves move the dic-
tionary reassures us. The Linnaean classifica-
tion of plants and animals turned largely (but
not exclusively) on the “movement” of the
latter and the fixity of the former. As Foucault
writes in The Order of Things:
If living beings are a classification, the
plant is best able to express its limpid
essence; but if they are a manifestation
of life, the animal is better equipped to
make its enigma perceptible [2004: 302].
Animals make themselves known to us
through their movement. The spaces they




142 Foucault, however, goes further in ascrib-
ing to the late 18th century palaeontologist,
Georges Cuvier, a fundamental step in the
understanding of animal locomotion. Reject-
ing the static and ordered “deployment of the
visible” [Foucault 2004: 292] employed in
classical taxonomy, both Cuvier and Buffon
sought a more dynamic and functional com-
prehension of animal bodies, their movement,
their responsiveness and their being. For
Buffon, and the artists of the “Jardin du Roi”:
[Animal movement, and its representa-
tion, offered] a formidable and sus-
tained challenge to the hegemony of
the Cartesian animal-machine [Liebman
2010: 667].
The resultant 19th century shift from the
taxonomic ordering of the animal kingdom to
a more vitalist acknowledgement of individ-
ual, motile life was, in Foucault’s eyes, a
moment of epistemic change, one that argua-
bly led to the later separation of ethology
from comparative anatomy [Jaynes 1969].
More recently, the British geographer Sarah
Whatmore offers, “in place of the rigid coun-
ters of the flat maps and species inventories
of conservation science” [2006: 33], a more
fluid interpretation of formerly impermeable
categorisations. Animal mobilities, she argues,
and the “spaces of motion” they form, are
“relational achievements” that reach far beyond
mere biology and the simplicity of Nikolaas
Tinbergen’s “four Why’s” [1963].
“Animal”: the etymology is unequivocal,
“anima”: to breathe, to have spirit. To be
“animate” is to be alive, to move. To be
“inanimate” is to be still. One “animates” by
making move, one obviously thinks of “ani-
mation”. One “re-animates” by re-starting
motion. From the primary somatic movement
of the heartbeat, respiration and circulation,
flow other movements which collectively
become the animal (human or otherwise).
One might begin to think of the animal as an
achievement of multiple motions in space, but
an achievement that, in motion, is constantly
changing, never fixed. Without being random
or irrational, this spatialisation through move-
ment is, to use Deleuze and Guattari’s phrase
“nomadic” and “vibratory”, constructed from,
and in response to, the ever-shifting and
chaotic surrounding world and its affordances
[Lorraine 2005]. This is a surface defined
through presence and the performance of
movement a territorialisation, that Deleuzian
combination of milieu and rhythms.
Movement appears in Derrida’s definition
of animality in terms of “auto-motricity”:
A spontaneity that is capable of move-
ment, of organizing itself and affecting
itself, marking, tracing and affecting
itself with traces of its self [2008: 49].
Before Derrida, Bergson, in Creative evo-
lution argued that:
What constitutes animality is the faculty
of utilizing a releasing mechanism for
the conversion for as much stored-up
potential energy as possible into “explo-
sive” actions [i.e. movement and what he
famously referred to as the “élan vital”]
[1998: 132-133].
In the animal [...] all points to action,
that is to the utilization of energy




143Ultimately, for Bergson “movement is
reality itself” [ibid.: 171] leading us to sug-
gest: Reality = Life = Movement = Animal,
where the distinction between the object-
agent and its movement collapses [Boundas
1996]; a world whose reality is defined by
movement. If we think of animal movement
as a “process” then we rejoin Alfred N. White-
head and his “process philosophy” as well
as Deleuze and “becoming” as imminence.
Holmes Rolston III writes:
Wildlife is organic form in locomotion
[1987: 187].
Perhaps the most well known portrayal of
animal movement is the work of Muybridge
in the latter decades of the 19th century. It
comes as no surprise that Muybridge’s experi-
ments with moving film images should have
begun with animals. As Akira Lippit, com-
menting on Muybridge’s work, remarks:
The figure of the animal has always
been destined to serve as the symbol of
movement itself [2000: 185].
Muybridge’s film of the horse, in partic-
ular, has since become iconic. Muybridge
gave the name “zoopraxography”, as the study
of animal movement and invented the “zoo-
praxiscope” to display individual images
of animals as a continuous movement. For
Muybridge and his zoopraxiscope, like the
French photographer Étienne-Jules Marey and
his fusil photographique, the new technol-
ogies of deconstructing animal movement,
paralleling the new biological sciences which
were busy deconstructing animal bodies,
created a new animal ontology. As Stephen
Guidry puts it:
In these early attempts to make the
movement-being of animals legible, the
bodies of the animals and, ultimately,
the animals themselves are simplified
and stripped down to what is commonly
seen as their essence: moving parts. The
animals are understood as real because
their movement over time can be under-
stood within the duration of the filmic
event. Conversely, the filmic image is
understood as representing reality because
the animals are understandable as mov-
ing, as existing in real space and time
and doing what it is that animals do,
namely, moving about [2005: 60].
Yet, of course, these were not a continuous
movement. Jonathan Burt points out in a
recent paper [2006] that Muybridge’s films
are made up of individual images, independ-
ently taken. Were we to take a Bergsonian
or Deleuzian stand on this, we might argue
that real movement can never be simply a
sequence of static points:
Movement cannot be reconstituted on the
basis of instants any more than being can
be constituted on the basis of presents
[Boundas 1996: 83].
Movement is something more, in move-
ment there is life.
Animals also move away. The irony, as
Akira Lippitt points out [2000], as did John
Berger before him [1980], is that the growing
appearance of animals in film offered a coun-
terpoint to their growing dis-appearance in the
real world. Berger wrote:
Everywhere, animals disappear [1980:
12].
Animals move away, and there are today
legions of examples of such disappearance.
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or in other forms of technological resurrec-
tion, or indeed in zoos, which Berger defines
as monuments to loss and absence. Even
those animals that are present in zoos can
confound us by being still, by not performing
the movements we have come to associate
with them, often entirely wrongly. As a result,
animal movements become engineered into
spectacle, whether it be through the design of
enclosures which oblige animals to move in
certain “iconic” ways.
Most notably this is found in confinement
and restraint. Farm animals exemplify this
and particularly intensively reared farm ani-
mals; sows in farrowing crates, egg-laying
hens in batteries, veal calves in crates and so
on. They are denied movement, mobility and
motility; and consequently, we refer increas-
ingly to such practices as unnatural and, para-
doxically, inhuman. For a long time, they
were (and often still are) denied subjectivity
and feelings. The movements that counted
most were from the slaughterhouse, the
movements of international trade, as objects,
bodies and body parts, sites of accumulation
[Shukin 2009]. Domestication is first and
foremost, an act of corralling, of denying
“free” movement to animals and, as we have
got better at it, that physical denial of move-
ment has expanded into new forms; constrain-
ing genetic movement through breed controls,
constraining of somatic and psychological
movements through the use of drugs and
other interventions. For many advocates of
higher levels of farm animal welfare, it is so
often the lack of free movement that has
come to symbolise the unacceptable practices
of contemporary animal husbandry. Signifi-
cantly, the most successful animal welfare
gains over the last decade have been in the
area of “free-range” production, with “ran-
ging free” be the expression, through motility,
of animal subjectivity and therefore the right
for moral consideration.
Finally, in movement lies agency. Through
movement, non-human (and human) animals
define not only themselves but also both
space and time as their own [von Uexküll
2010]. It is principally through movement
that animals have been seen to have agency
in our anthropocentric world. That physical,
corporal and motile agency that attracts
our attention, whether it be through acts of
“resistance” or the active “co-construction”
and “co-assembly” of the world through pres-
ence and vitality as Donna Haraway describes
so well in When Species Meet [2008]. Sarah
McFarland and Ryan Hediger open their book
on Animals and Agency [2009] with the story
of a tiger escaping from San Francisco zoo
and killing a spectator. David Lulka, in a fas-
cinating piece of Herzog’s movie Grizzly Man
in that same book, maintains that:
Movement, being multidimensional at
its core, is perhaps the most illustrative
and ubiquitous manifestation of agency
[2009: 87].
The challenge for contemporary animal
studies, and particularly those that draw in the
social sciences, is how to conceptualize and
engage with the liveliness of animal move-
ment as a legitimate way of knowing, exchang-
ing and developing “aesthetic” [Johnston 2008]





[How to] develop modes of affirmative
critique for witnessing and evoking lively
non-human difference and the forces
that pass between human and animal
bodies [2010: 238].
Anyone who works with animals, plays
with animals, keeps animals knows that it
is predominantly through movement and
through their embodied actions that animals
negotiate with us and with each other. Move-
ment then, becomes more than functionality
and physiological causation, more than agency;
it becomes communication, interrelation and
so on emerging dimensions of this motile
ontology. In the growing animal studies liter-
ature, particular attention is now being paid
to embodied and performative approaches as
a means of witnessing and accounting for “the
practical, sensual and affective dimensions
to human-non-human interactions” [Lorimer
2010: 238].
It is to these approaches I now turn.
Movement as Communication
and Understanding
Embodied movement is something we human
animals share with our non-human animalian
confrères; that ability to be “able” [Nussbaum
2006]. Jakob von Uexküll [2010] recognised
body movement, along with form but also
independent of it as a critical perception mark
for animal subjectivity. The question I want
to turn to here is to what extent recognition
of a communality in embodied movement
allows us to reach across human and non-
human subjectivities in the creation of
Donna Haraway’s elusive “positive knowl-
edge” [2008]. Such communality was hinted
at by Darwin:
The young and the old of widely differ-
ent races, both with man and animals,
express the same state of mind by the
same movements [1899: 405].
In her consideration of Lorenz’ work with
geese and jackdaws, Vinciane Despret makes
a valuable connection. “Using his own body
as a tool for knowing, as a tool for asking
questions, as a means to create a relation that
provides new knowledge”, Lorenz, she writes,
creates a sense of “being with” a young goose
that constitutes a mutual co-domestication or
“anthropo-zoo-genetic practice” [2004: 130-
131]:
This experience by which Lorenz
constructs a “being with” sheds light on
one of the ways bodies and worlds artic-
ulate each other: it is a particular mode
of “disposing” both body and world.
Lorenz produces a goose’s body to
allow a goose’s world to affect him
(and also to allow a human’s world to
affect a goose). He learns to be affected
[ibid.: 131].
This is a different form of language. As
Vicky Hearne puts it:
With horses, as with dogs the handler
must learn to believe, to “read” a lan-
guage s/he hasn’t sufficient neurological
apparatus to test or judge [1986: 107].
Later, she goes on:
To be understood is to be open to under-
standing [ibid.: 109].
Of course, this communication between
human and non-human can also betray us.
Reviewing the famous story of Hans the




Their bodies were talking and moving
against their will, outside the frame of
their consciousness [2004: 113].
Deleuze and Guattari write “To become
animal is to participate in movement” [1986:
13] as the primatologist Barbara Smuts makes
clear through the embodied empathy in her
telling of an encounter with baboons in East
Africa:
The process of gaining their trust,
changed almost everything about me,
including the way I walked and sat, the
way I held my body, and the way I used
my eyes and voice. I was learning a
whole new way of being in the world
– the way of the baboon. I was not liter-
ally moving like a baboon – my very
different morphology prevented that but
rather I was responding to the cues that
baboons use to indicate their emotions,
motivations and intentions to one another,
and I was gradually learning to send such
signals back to them [2001: 295].
In these encounters, Barbara Smuts has
found, what Lori Brown calls “a valid form
of communication and a foundation for ethics;
and an interpenetration that yields a shared,
co-created field of meaning and a concomi-
tant ethical engagement” [2007: 276]. Barbara
Smuts herself goes on:
I had gone from thinking about the
world analytically to experiencing the
world directly and intuitively. It was
then that something long slumbering
awoke inside me, a yearning to be in the
world as my ancestors had done, as all
creatures were designed to do by aeons
of evolution. Lucky me. I was surrounded
by experts who could show the way.
Learning to be more of an animal came
easily as I let go of layers of thinking
and doing that sometimes served me
back home but were only hindrances
here [...] With great satisfaction, I relin-
quished my separate self and slid into
the ancient experience of belonging to a
mobile community of fellow primates
[2001: 299-300].
Movement then is a way of bridging
the human/non-human divide, the positive
knowledge of sharing movement with animals
through encounter, through being together,
whether on the farm, at home, in the wild and
so on:
Rhythms create multivariate, possible
relations amongst living things expressed
within and operating across different
milieus [Lorimer 2010: 61].
Bodily movement is a co-alignment that
helps us understand each others’ needs [Brown
2007]. Through body movement, animals not
only express, enact and develop their agency
but they communicate that agency to others
(to us) just as we do to them, creating new co-
assemblages of movement. Movement becomes
a mode of existence [Ingold 2011] that is
common to human and non-human alike and
therefore a basis not only for human/non-
human somatic sensibility [Greenhough and
Roe 2011] but also ethical engagement:
I begin to construct an ethics of move-
ment, an ethics in which movement is
viewed not only as a means of redefin-
ing human/non-human relations, but also
as a means of facilitating the agency of
non-humans in the construction of their
own development [Lulka 2004: 440].
In recent years, a growing number of
researchers and scholars have sought to
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147extend the early interactive and observational
approaches pioneered by primatologists like
Jane Goodall, Dian Fossey and later Barbara
Smuts to explore novel ways of using shared
sensory, haptic and motile experiences with
animals as a means not only of developing
common practical knowledges and under-
standings but also of moving towards a more-
than anthropomorphically representational and
more symmetrical sense of a common cultural
community where animals actions and animal
agency are “no longer downplayed or ignored”
[Franklin et al. 2007: 45] but are recognised
as embodied forms of cross-species under-
standing and sensibility. New multi-species
ethnographies or “zooethnologies” open up to
investigation those “contact zones where lines
separating nature from culture have broken
down, where encounters between Homo sa-
piens and other beings generate mutual ecol-
ogies and co-produced niches” [Kirksey and
Helmreich 2010: 546].
Pet and companion animals, particularly
through play relationships with humans, have
understandably proved more accessible to these
new “trans-species methodologies”. 1 Donna
Haraway, for example, refers to play between
human and dog as only occurring among
“those willing to risk letting go of the literal”
[2008: 240]. She refers to “those wonderful,
joy-enticing signals like play bows and feints
[that] usher us over the threshold into the
world of meanings that do not mean what
they seem [...] the world of meanings loosed
from their functions is the game of co-
presence in the contact zone” [ibid.: 240].
Colin Jerolmak observes:
Humans do not simply teach their
dogs how to play; they evolve routines
together ones that work for them [2009:
377].
In his account of play with his dog Kate,
David Goode [2007] employs a similar ethno-
methodological approach to reveal and explore
the intersubjectivities that both permit and
result from play. Goode describes that play,
and the phenomenological layers of his and
Kate’s mutual engagement, in the following
way:
Matters assumed but not communicated;
matters communicated but not spoken;
and matters formulated into language.
Under such a conception, “what is known
or taken for granted in common” is not a
reflection of language but of “assumed”
intersubjective phenomenon anterior to
formulation into language [...] Percep-
tion of and action upon naturally given
features of the world do reflect the social
membership of participants [2007: 89].
The key here is not a belief in mutual and
symmetrical intentionality or even, necessa-
rily, a sense of a broader ontological flatten-
ing between human and animal. Rather it lies
in the emergence of possibly shared set of
knowledges, practices and ultimately culture,
and “the interconnectedness of the various
embodiments of this social form” [Jerolmak
2009: 387]. Jerolmak’s analysis of human-
animal play reveals non instrumental asso-
ciations that go beyond the formalities of
1. See J. Bradshaw and H. Nott [1995] ; A. Miklósi
et al. [2000] ; M. Bekoff [2004] ; R. Fox [2006] ;
É. Laurier et al. [2006] ; A. Franklin et al. [2007] ;
D. Goode [2007] and A. Horowitz [2009].
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themselves” [ibid.: 386] in what Catherine
Johnston calls a process of “becoming liminal
through play” [2009: 178].
Such approaches demand new methodo-
logical devices in which the movement and
corporeality of both observer and observed
are intertwined in a process of joint trans-
species accounting [Franklin et al. 2007].
The difficulty is often to know what to look
for/at. Which events, relations, movements are
the stuff of such accounting? For Catherine
Johnston [2009], citing Marc Higgin [2004]
the critical process is that of learning to both
perceive and extricate the otherwise unno-
ticed, unremarked and unrepresented. In a
recent chapter that looks through the lenses of
ethology and phenomenology to go beyond
the seemingly absolute alterity of animals in
human-animal associations, Hayden Lorimer
explores what he calls “the lore of their like-
ness and the consequences of inter-species
sociality for the figuring of personhood”
[2010: 56]. Observing seals over a period of
several seasons basking on a river bank and,
in his terms “learning-by-witnessing” [ibid.:
72], Hayden Lorimer identifies the study of
movement and other embodiments as a future
research trajectory for the “beyond worlds” of
animal life and highlights the methodological
importance of “watchfulness”: in other words
an openness to the nearness (which contains
elements of both likeness and otherness) of
inter-species relations. Yet there is another
dimension at work here too; that of being or
becoming interesting. For a more genuine,
more generous animal studies needs to respond
not only to what human researchers find inter-
esting about non-human animals but also to
what non-human animals might find interest-
ing, either about each other or about us. In an
intriguing chapter, Vinciane Despret [2005]
asks: “Do sheep have opinions?” Drawing on
the work of the primatologist Thelma Rowell,
she explores an ethology that rather than sim-
ply observing behaviour according to our own
hypotheses creates the possibility of new
voices and new visibilities revealing of other
ways of seeing.
Within the field of farm animal welfare,
Françoise Wemelsfelder [2007] has pioneered
the technique known as “qualitative behaviour
assessment” which uses the human observa-
tion and “qualitative perception” of farm ani-
mal bodies and their movement to discern the
latter’s subjective experience and emotional
state. Avoiding the classic interpretive error of
the “grinning chimpanzee”, she argues:
It is not the grin that is the body lan-
guage; it is how the animal grins, how
its whole body moves, that makes the
grin an expression of fear, or anger, or
something else [2007: 28].
Françoise Wemelsfelder’s methodology
involves the close observation of animal
movement, expressive state and behaviour.
Critically, for her, such expressive states are
taken not as abstractions but as lived and
observed moments in time [Wemelsfelder
et al. 2001]. The result, she suggests, is a
significant shift away from classic approach
of animal behavioural studies:
Thus it is not the “walking”, “biting” or




behaviours, that express fear or confi-
dence: the animal expresses these
qualities through its behaviours. This
principle, that animals are expressive
“behavers” rather than assembled strings
of “behaviour”, is known in the wider
psychological and philosophical litera-
ture as “agency” [ibid.: 219].
Reporting, on the one hand, “significant
agreement between observers in the interpre-
tation of the animals’ behavioural expres-
sions” [Wemelsfelder 2007: 29], and strong
correlations between these “subjective” obser-
vations and physiological measures such as
animal heart rate and heart rate variability,
Françoise Wemelsfelder argues:
When we take the time to closely
observe animals and the quality of their
expressions, we can develop greater
insight into their welfare and quality of
life [id.].
Elsewhere, Xavier Boivin and his col-
leagues [2003], Paul Hemsworth and Grahame
Coleman [1998] have demonstrated the impor-
tance of positive human contact and physical
interaction between stockperson and farm ani-
mal in the latter’s welfare. They explore the
possibility of shared meaning and coordination
between farm animal and stockperson as each
becomes accustomed, and is reassured by, the
others familiar movements [Waiblinger et al.
2005].
Moving on
This paper has explored movement as a lexicon
of human/non-human relational cognisance,
“somatic sensibility” [Greenhough and Roe
2011], and “dwelt understanding” [Johnston
2009]. It has suggested that embodied practi-
ces with animals constitute an important means
of rendering articulate, opening up and partic-
ipating in shared endeavour that uses “the
space between them to live with, rather than
past, each other” [Johnston 2009: 154]. The
consequences of this are, as we have seen,
both ontological and ethical.
Of course, there are also limitations. In
their comparison of scientists’ relationships to
both human and animal experimental subjects,
Beth Greenhough and Emma Roe [2011]
identify a number of risks emerging from an
ethics based entirely upon “somatic sensibili-
ties”. Two of them concern us here.
The first is anthropomorphism, long criti-
cised by the natural science as an unaccept-
able form of mentalism not amenable to
objective study [Wynne 2007]. Recent animal-
studies writings however have been swift to
turn to the creative, empathetic and intuitive
aspects of a more reflexive anthropomorphism,
born not from the distance of observation but
from the closeness of intertwined lives.
They have proposed such variants as “critical
anthropomorphism” [Burghart 1991], “reverse
anthropomorphism” [Webster 2011] respon-
sible and informed or “aesthetic anthropo-
morphism” [Johnston 2009]. Such novel
approaches espouse the idea that revised forms
of anthropomorphism offer, at worst, a partial
escape from anthropocentrism and, at best, a
recognition of what we share with animals,
and can experience with them, rather than
simply what makes us different.
The second concern is proximity, both
physical proximity (being with) and taxonomic
Henry Buller
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150 proximity (being like). Certainly, contemporary
accounts of embodied human-animal inter-
action place special emphasis on the physical-
ity of play, touch, regard and so on within
what is often an inter-mammalian “contact
zone”, favouring such sites as the home
[Jeromak 2009], the training ground [Haraway
2008], the garden [Johnston 2009], the labora-
tory [Greenhough and Roe 2011] and the park
[Laurier et al. 2006]. Yet more distant animal
movements can also be shown to be constitu-
tive of embodied networks of human-animal
relations [Whatmore and Thorne 2000] and
non-human ontologies [Lulka 2004]. Move-
ment is not simply the physical displacement
of self-propelled entities across the surface of
the world. Rather, as Tim Ingold points out,
it is the very texture of the world [2011]. Of
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Henry Buller, “One Slash of Light, then Gone”: Animals Henry Buller, « Un rai de lumière et puis plus rien » :
as Movement les animaux comme mouvement
Animals are defined by movement. Animals are move- Les animaux sont définis par le mouvement. Comme
ment. As Akira Lippit remarks: “The figure of the ani- l’a souligné Akira Lippit : « La figure de l’animal a tou-
mal has always been destined to serve as the symbol of jours servi de symbole au mouvement lui-même. » Les
movement itself”. Animals never stop moving, never animaux ne cessent jamais de se mouvoir, ne cessent
stop moving us, never stop moving across and between jamais de nous faire bouger et ne cessent jamais de fran-
the frontiers by which we set them apart. In the invigo- chir les frontières que nous avons établies entre eux et
rated engagement between the social sciences and ani- nous. Dans l’intérêt renouvelé que les sciences sociales
mal worlds, movement and the sharing of movement portent au monde animal, le mouvement et le partage
offer us the potential for original ways of knowing ani- du mouvement offre une voie originale pour appréhen-
mals and of understanding our relationship to them. der les animaux et comprendre nos relations avec eux.
This paper explores that potential and the ontological Cet article nous invite à réfléchir aux conséquences
and ethical consequences it has for living with animals. ontologiques et éthiques de cette nouvelle approche.
Keywords Mots clés
animals, movement, post-humanism, human-animal animaux, mouvement, post-humanisme, relations homme-
relations animal
